The purpose of this briefing is to show the current status of aerial reconnaissance programs which are conducted proximate to Communist territory.

These operations are conducted by the Unified and Specified Commanders by authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special units of SAC, USAFE, PACAF, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participate. In the European area, a similar program is conducted by the Royal Air Force. This effort is integrated with ours. All areas of the Sino-Soviet periphery -- where we have authority to operate -- are covered at periodic intervals.

Special units of the Strategic Air Command, the Pacific Air Force and the United States Air Force in Europe currently are engaged in reconnaissance activities in all areas proximate to Communist territory where the USAF is authorized to operate. These activities are designed to collect Electronic Intelligence, Communications Intelligence, Photography and, on occasion, intelligence which may be obtained through the use of other sensors, such as high resolution radar and infra red devices.

The Strategic Air Command has two wings which engage in peripheral reconnaissance operations. These are:

a. 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wings, Forbes AFB, Kansas. This wing is equipped with 29 RB-47H ELINT aircraft, 3 ERB-47H laboratory ELINT aircraft and 3 B-47E aircraft equipped with telemetry intercept equipment. This force represents approximately 95 percent of the USAF ELINT capability. Normally, detachments of this wing, plus supporting tanker aircraft, are maintained at four overseas operating locations:

(1) Brize Norton, England: 1 RB-47H and 1 KC-135 Tanker. Prior to 1 July 1960, this detachment flew approximately 6 sorties per month in the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, and along the East-West German border.

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(4) Eielson, Alaska: 2 RB-47H and 2 KC-135. An average of 8 sorties per month, prior to 1 July 60, were flown by this detachment around the Soviet Arctic periphery from Petropavlovsk on the Manchatka Peninsula to Novaya Zemlya in the Barents Sea.

b. 4080th S.R.W., Laughlin AFB, Texas. This wing operates 24 U-2 aircraft, of which 12 are configured for photographic reconnaissance, 4 for ELINT, 2 for high resolution radar photography and 6 for high altitude atmospheric sampling. The photographic reconnaissance capability is utilized to satisfy special requirements for long range oblique photography. Operation Congo Maiden, conducted from Eielson, Alaska, against Soviet Arctic Coastal objectives in March and April of this year is an example. The ELINT and HRR configured aircraft represent a standby EWO capability, while the Samplers are used in support of [redacted] agencies requiring high altitude atmospheric samples.

Under USAFE, the 7499th Support Group, Rhine Main, Germany, operates C-130 Communications Intercept aircraft in the Baltic Sea, along the East-West German border, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. Other reconnaissance activities conducted by this organization include covert photography from specially equipped transport aircraft in the Berlin Corridors, ELINT along the East-West German borders and on airways over Yugoslavia, and long range oblique photography in the Baltic and Adriatic Seas.

The 7499th Support Group operates:

(1) 7 C-130 (Communications Intercept, approximately 75 per month)

(2) 4 T-29 (Covert photography in the Berlin Corridors, approximately 12 per month)

(3) 1 C-97 (Long range oblique photography in the Berlin Corridors and along the E-W German border, approximately 12 per month)

(4) 1 RB-47A (Long range oblique photography in the Baltic and Adriatic Seas, approximately 2 per month)

[redacted]

The U.S. Navy supports the COMINT/ELINT Effort in Europe and the Far East. A Naval Air Squadron at [redacted] is equipped with 4 WV-2Q's and 8 A3D-2's which support the Navy Detachment at [redacted]

[redacted]

These aircraft also participate in Fleet exercises and training.

In the Far East. A similar unit (8 A3D-2Q and 4 WV-2Q) is based at [redacted]

The objective of these various programs is intelligence -- ELINT, COMINT and PHOTOGRAPHY.

[redacted]

Photography -- We are speaking here primarily of Long Range Oblique Photography obtained from aircraft operating over international waters and friendly territory.... also of photography from covertly installed cameras in transport aircraft operating in the Berlin Corridors. Through photographic reconnaissance we can locate and pinpoint new Soviet facilities.... and confirm intelligence obtained from other sources.

[redacted] We need photography to confirm the location of these sites. The Navy, as another example, uses photography to keep track of Soviet submarines based at Vlone, Albania. I might add that peripheral photography is extremely important, especially since overflight operations cannot be conducted at this time.

Authority to conduct these various operations is contained in JCS 2150/29, dated 9 April 1947. This paper recognizes the necessity of conducting reconnaissance in close proximity to Communist territory and fully recognizes the risk of shooting incidents which may result. Consequently, JCS 2150/29 stresses the need to conduct these operations in a manner which will tend to avoid incidents. Certain other specific points are pertinent to this briefing:

a. Flights will be conducted only over friendly territory or international waters [redacted]

b. It directs that aircraft will not be operated in a provocative manner.

c. Rules of engagement are defined and,

d. It emphasizes the need for prompt reporting of incidents.

In line with JCS directives, basic rules have been established. These are reflected in current operations order under which peripheral reconnaissance activities are conducted. [redacted]

[redacted]

Crews are specifically briefed prior to each mission on the importance of avoiding incidents. Detailed restrictions and procedures to be followed in their area of operation are reviewed.

[redacted]

Experience has shown that close operational coordination is required to preclude incidents which are more likely to occur when two aircraft may be operating in the same area at the same time. Consequently, procedures are currently in effect within PACOM, EUCOM, and ALCOM to effect this operational coordination to prevent mutual interference. What this coordination consists of is simply a monthly integration of all programs by the operators concerned. In Europe, for example, these meetings are attended by representatives of the Navy, Army, SAC, USAFE and the RAF; and their representatives firm up monthly flight schedules and eliminate conflicts which may exist by mutual agreement.

The USAF has in being a Special Activities Group here in the Pentagon through which these peripheral operations are monitored. The purpose of establishing this Center was threefold:

(1) To provide for monitoring all sensitive AF operations on a world-wide basis at the Washington level to recommend such action as may be necessary to preclude incidents.

(2) To insure the most rapid reporting of incidents.

(3) To effect operational coordination at this level as required.

Intentions of all AF peripheral operations are received in the Center on a monthly basis. At this time we are aware of specific routes and dates

of operations. This information is plotted and the proposed operations are evaluated in light of operational considerations and known reaction to previous missions. Prior to the launching of each mission we receive a 24-hour intention giving specific take-off time and time enroute. We also receive a landing report including a brief narrative or pilot report of the flight. By close coordination between Operations and Intelligence, all reaction to peripheral operations is reviewed, and adjustments to programs are recommended as required. Although this review is conducted on a timely basis, we do not, however, monitor flights in progress.

In the event of an incident, procedures are in effect to provide the most rapid notification from the field to our Center through secure communications channels. Because of the impact of incidents in the JCS and other Government agencies, we immediately notify the Chief of Staff, Air Force; Chairman JCS; Department of State and other agencies as may be necessary.

Coordination of operations at this level is required from time to time, particularly when non-standard or unusual operations are proposed.