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FILE NO.	SUBJECT
	NSA Continuity of Operations Plan

TO DISTRIBUTION FROM ADN DATE 20 June 1962 COMMENT NO. 1

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1. Your concurrance and/or comments on the attached draft of the NSA Continuity of Operations Plan (Basic Plan) are requested within thirty days from above date.

2. If a reply is not received in the time stated D31 will assume you have concurred.

3. This correspondence may be declassified upon removal of the inclosure and physical removal of the caveat notation.

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Incl:
a/s

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PLAN FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

I. GENERAL SITUATION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. The purpose of this plan is to provide for the continuity of operations of the National Security Agency under the following conditions:

a. Condition ALPHA considers that the entire defense organization at the seat of government and/or in other target areas not permanently relocated prior to surprise attack is totally destroyed and there are but few survivors. This is the condition under which alternate headquarters planning is based.

b. Condition BRAVO considers that there is sufficient warning of impending attack to remove all or substantial numbers of personnel performing essential functions to emergency relocation sites. This is the condition under which emergency relocation planning is based.

c. Condition of Strategic Warning considers that there is strategic warning of attack or sufficient world tension to cause dispatch of strategic alert cadres.

2. The plan consists of a basic plan together with several annexes. The basic plan is divided into [redacted] paragraphs and portrays the general scheme and actions required to continue effectively operations under attack or other

national emergency conditions. The annexes provide the detailed procedures, information, actions and lists of designated personnel required to implement the basic plan. To achieve its intended purpose the plan must be continuously reviewed and kept current. In view of this requirement, it has been prepared in a looseleaf style which will permit the changing of pages in either the basic plan or the annexes whenever necessary.

3. The scope of this plan covers all personnel, functions, equipment and other activities of the National Security Agency, and provides general guidance to the Major Organizations, Field Activities and the SCAs in the preparation of their appropriate annexes.

B. AUTHORITY

1. DOD Directive C-3020.26, 10 June 1960 directs the development and maintenance of current continuity of operations plan for every component of the Defense establishment.

2. NSA Regulation No. 20-5, 16 March 1962 directs the development and maintenance of a National Security Agency Continuity of Operations Plan.

C. ASSUMPTIONS

1. Potential enemies have the capability for launching a thermonuclear attack against Washington and other key points in the United States and such an attack, if launched, would be in sufficient force to insure that some of the weapons would be delivered on target. (If an attack on these points were successful) NSA activities located therein would be incapable of performing their essential functions from those locations.

2. Immediately following an attack only those NSA activities which had been relocated from target areas prior to the attack would be able to carry out their essential functions. Other activities which were unable to implement emergency relocation plans prior to attack would have to have their essential functions carried on by other members of the cryptologic community until sufficient personnel were available to reconstitute the activities.

3. The NSA Strategic Alert Cadre is a group of designated personnel whose knowledge and skills are needed to perform essential wartime functions for NSA or to reconstitute such functions if present facilities are destroyed. This group of personnel would be ordered to the relocation site or to an interim relocation area upon declaration of DEFCOM I (Defense Readiness Condition One) or upon orders of the Secretary of Defense during times of increased tension and periods of strategic warning.

4. Active duty military personnel will serve out their normal tour of duty with the Agency.

5. Retired military personnel, working in the Agency as civilians, will be recalled to active duty only at their own request or unless otherwise directed by the President.

6. Reserve personnel may be recalled to active duty in mobilization billets other than NSA as designated by their parent military department.

7. All NSA personnel overseas on D-Day, including those on temporary duty, will be considered to be serving in key wartime billets within the Field Activity organization of the area in which they are present.

D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Operations conducted by NSA in time of National Emergency will be directed toward insuring the fullest possible discharge of the SIGINT, COMSEC and CRITICOMM missions.

2. In the absence of priorities expressed by consumers, the Director, NSA, will establish priorities in accordance with his best judgment. Within these priorities, predominant effort will be directed against enemy governments and their forces. SIGINT objectives for national emergency operations in order of descending priority are:

a. Early warning of impending attacks on the U.S., U.S. forces and possessions, allies, and allied forces and possessions.

b. Bomb damage assessment.

c. Support to military commanders (Including JCS, SAC, CONAD, etc.) for their operations.

d. Intelligence on uncommitted countries, econcomic warfare etc.

3. During a national emergency the COMSEC mission will be essentially the same as at present. Primarily, effort and resources will be applied to the transmission security and compromise evaluation area and toward reassessment of the degree of security provided by operational cryptosystem under wartime use to determine the requirement for: accelerated supersession rates for cryptomaterials, increased compartmentation of cryptosystems, and alteration in keying methods and operating procedures.

4. The functions of the R/D organization will be directed toward completion of only those projects which, by intense effort, may be expected to provide the United States with a substantially greater SIGINT and COMSEC advantage than that enjoyed with ~~otherwise~~ existing and available materials. All personnel who can be released will be made available to other NSA operations in more direct support to the war effort.

II. OPERATIONS

A. ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS AND RELOCATION SITES

The alternate relocation headquarters for the SIGINT, COMSEC and CRITICOMM missions of NSA are:

1. For the Director, NSA: Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia.

2. For SIGINT: The U.S. Air Force Security Service, San Antonio, Texas.

3. For COMSEC: The CSEC Facility Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia.

4. For CRITICOMM: The U.S. Air Force Security Service, San Antonio, Texas.

B. ASSEMBLY AREAS

1. Assembly area for NSA, Fort Meade employees surviving an attack will be Indiantown Gap Military Reservation.

2. Assembly area for NSS employees surviving an attack will be Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia.

C. TASKS

1. The Commander, USAFSS, will:

a. Establish NSA Alternate Headquarters for SIGINT and CRITICOMM at USAFSS facilities, San Antonio, Texas.

b. Prepare plans for the operations of an NSA Alternate Headquarters to provide for continuity of essential SIGINT-CRITICOMM functions and submit such plans to Director, NSA, for approval and incorporation as Annex A to the NSA Continuity of Operations Plan.

c. Receive, become familiar with, and maintain documents vital to the continuity of operational control of the U.S. SIGINT-CRITICOMM effort.

d. Make preparations for the provision of working space, food, shelter, and other necessities for 170 NSA personnel (Alert Cadre) to be relocated at USAFSS, San Antonio, Texas.

e. Designate personnel from his command to perform essential wartime SIGINT-CRITICOMM functions if NSA personnel originally designated to relocate do not arrive at Alternate Headquarters.

f. Activate NSA Alternate Headquarters for SIGINT operations

(1) When so ordered by the Director, NSA.

(2) When condition ALPHA obtains.

g. Continue direction of U.S. SIGINT-CRITICOMM effort at NSA Alternate Headquarters for SIGINT until control is assumed by ADP or appointed successor.

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2. Commander USASA will:

a. Establish an alternate headquarters for the Director, NSA with a staff of approximately twenty-five and the NSA Communications Security organization with approximately three hundred personnel.

b. Make provisions for space, food, shelter and other necessities for NSA personnel at Vint Hill Farms.

c. Prepare plans to implement the above tasks and submit to Director, NSA for approval and incorporation as Annex B to the NSA Continuity of Operations Plan.

3. Chiefs NSA Field Activities will:

a. Act for the Director under condition ALPHA and during periods of communications failure between NSA and their areas.

b. Based on the conditions and assumptions stated herein submit local continuity of operations plans to Director, NSA for approval and incorporation as annexes to this plan.

4. NSA Major Organizations will prepare plans for the continuity of operations of their functions to be included as annexes to this basic plan. Consideration should be given the following as appropriate:

Essential Functions

Essential Personnel

Alert Cadres

Vital Records

Transportation.

Communications

Machinery and Equipment

5. The chiefs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies will make known to the Director, NSA, which elements in existence or planned are designed with the capability to provide direct support of military operations and which are intended to provide SIGINT information to the National Center.

III. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

A. SUPPLY

1. The Chiefs of NSA Field Activities are responsible for the pre D-Day positioning, in their areas of responsibility, of available selected, reasonably protected essential supplies and equipment positioned and maintained in such a manner as to be readily available for the technical support of this plan untill resupply can be effected.

2. Logistic support of NSA Field Activities and SUSLO's as stipulated in effective NSA Support Requirements documents.

B. TRANSPORTATION

1. The chief management service will provide for the necessary transportation to move personnel and equipment to the ERS. (See Annex G)

C. PERSONNEL

Personnel and administrative management for NSA Field Activities and SUSLO's as stipulated in Annex G.

IV. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. COMMAND

1. Execution. This document:

a. Is effective immediately for planning purposes.

b. Will be implemented at the direction of the Director, NSA or when condition ALPHA obtains.

2. Succession

a. In the event of death, absence or disability of the Director, NSA, the following shall succeed to the position of Director, NSA in the order indicated, pending action by the Secretary of Defense:

(1) Deputy Director, NSA

(2) Military Assistant Directors of NSA in accordance with date of rank.

b. Succession within the major NSA organizations, staff and field activities, will be as set forth in Annexes E to K inclusive.

B. COMMUNICATIONS

See Annex C.

ANNEXES:

A. USAFSS Plan for Establishment of NSA Alternate Headquarters at Kelly Field

B. USASA Plan for Alternate NSA Headquarters and COMSEC Activities at Vint Hill Farms

C. Communications

D. Production Organization Plan

E. Communications Security Organization Plan

F. Research and Development Organization Plan

G. Management Services Organization Plan

H. National Cryptologic Staff Plan

I. NSA Alaska Plan

J. NSA Europe Plan

K. NSA Pacific Plan

L. NSA Alert Cadre Plan