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Reviewed, audited,  
edited July 1990  
MST  
Ready for final typing

Declassified and approved for  
release by NSA on 07-21-2015  
pursuant to E.O. 13526 ST  
30296

NSA-OH-10-81

WILLIAM LUTWINIAK

by

Robert Farley

Pl, Headquarters, NSA

18 October 1981

FARLEY:

Today is the 18th of October 1981. Our interviewee, Mr. William Lutwiniak. Mr. Lutwiniak, one of NSA's foremost cryptanalysts, joined the Signal Intelligence Service as a civilian in 1941 as a result of recruitment by Mr. William Friedman. Mr. Lutwiniak later enlisted in the U. S. Army and was immediately assigned to Arlington Hall in 1942. In 1943 he joined the Signal Intelligence Service in New Delhi, India, or the CBI Theatre. On this tape Mr. Lutwiniak will discuss his career. The interview is taking place in the Pl area, 8th Floor, Headquarters Building at NSA. Interviewer, Bob Farley. Classification of this single tape is <sup>TOP</sup> SECRET HANDLE COMINT CHANNELS.

FARLEY:

Why don't we get underway? I do appreciate your time; I know you're a busy man. But first of all, let's get underway and what I'd like is a little information on your teenage days, where you went to school before <sup>the</sup> military, and then we could pick it up, military basic training and Arlington Hall and whatever else you want to talk about, sir.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

2

LUTWINIAK:  
~~(WM)~~

I'm a high school graduate, I never got to any college. My military career is closely connected with working for NSA and its predecessors, and I guess by way of background on that, I had an early interest in crossword puzzles which led to an interest in cryptograms and I entered a contest in a detective magazine, Detective Fiction Weekly, if memory serves, which had a cryptogram department. <sup>It</sup> came out every week, they had five or six cryptograms in it. ~~and this~~ <sup>This</sup> one time they had a contest where the first five or six <sup>solutions</sup> ~~allusions~~ got subscriptions to something called the Cryptogram which is the publication of the American Cryptograms Society. I entered the contest and I won a year's subscription, ~~which interested~~ <sup>which</sup> got me exposed to the great world of ciphers. I guess I was all of 13 <sup>or 14</sup> ~~or 11~~ at the time. I found that <sup>s</sup> fascinating. I rapidly became one of the foremost solvers in the ACA and I kept that up for some years and then in late '39 or maybe early '40, I got a communication from the Signal Intelligence Service, William Friedman, asking me if I'd be interested in signing up for the Army extension courses on cryptography and cryptanalyses with a view perhaps to subsequent employment. <sup>It had been</sup> ~~Been~~ one of my fondest dreams to some day be a cryptanalyst as a profession. It never occurred to me that it might actually happen. I didn't think there was any such place in the government. So I took these extension courses and I worked my way through <sup>M</sup> military <sup>C</sup> cryptography and <sup>M</sup> military <sup>C</sup> cryptanalyses I and <sup>M</sup> military

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

<sup>C</sup>ryptanalyses II <sup>and</sup> I guess I was almost entirely through  
<sup>M</sup>military <sup>C</sup>rypt III when I got an offer for employment

which I jumped at. They asked me how much I wanted, <sup>and</sup>

~~At~~ I was then employed in the garment sector and I figured  
 \$30 a week <sup>would</sup> be a munificent raise. I asked for that and  
 I wound up getting <sup>1440.00</sup> ~~\$14.40~~ per annum, per annum.

FARLEY: That's about a week's salary now.

~~WM: Lutwiniak~~ Then they asked me to get a physical and send them the  
 (Change WM to LUTWINIAK THROUGHOUT) bill of health from the doctor which I did and I subsequently  
 got a notice to report to work on February 1st 1941.

FARLEY: This was at the Munitions Building?

WM: ~~L~~ - ~~—~~ At the Munitions Building, that's right. I walked in and  
 briefly chatted with Mr. Friedman who turned me over to  
 my subsequent boss, Solomon Kullback and I went to work.  
 And I guess I was very gainfully employed and having a  
 lot of fun working on all kinds of stuff, mostly German,  
<sup>That</sup> ~~that~~ was the German section, but we had an awful lot of  
 the spy ciphers to work on <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ was a lot of fun. The  
 place got crowded rather fast and being a young bachelor  
 I wound up on swing shift naturally. Matter of fact I  
 think I worked the whole war on swing shift. But by then  
 we were at war and the draft board was breathing down my  
 neck, so I got an interview with then <sup>the</sup> Captain Hayes of  
 the Signal Corp.<sup>s</sup>

FARLEY: Harold Hayes?

WM: Harold Hayes, Harold G. Hayes and told him I didn't want

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

to get drafted because I was afraid I'd get out of the business, <sup>and</sup> I'd become an infantryman. I asked him if there was any way at all I could arrange to volunteer and get inducted into the Signal Corp<sup>s</sup> and continue to work at SIS. And I explained to him that there was some financial difficulty involved because I was sending half my salary home. ~~It was~~ <sup>My</sup> mother was a widow. I had three younger brothers and I worried about that. I guess he took some notes and I must<sup>have</sup> said the right things in the right way because I subsequently was told to go down to the <sup>G</sup>greyhound bus station on New York Avenue ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~Street~~ and enlist <sup>at</sup> in the recruiting office there where I would get orders. So I went down there and I passed the physical, wasn't much to that, and the sergeant there gave me <sup>to</sup> ~~an~~ understand ~~about~~ they'd been expecting me, ~~and~~ <sup>After</sup> ~~after~~ I was sworn in he said, <sup>"Here</sup> ~~here~~ are your orders, ~~and~~ <sup>My</sup> ~~my~~ orders were to report to Captain Hayes at the Munitions Building.

FARLEY:

Beautiful.

WM:

Went to Captain Hayes at the Munitions Building, <sup>He</sup> he said, "Well ~~well~~ okay go back to work and we'll worry about getting you a uniform and some basic training and things like that."

FARLEY:

Did you come in as a PVT?

WM:

That was the other part of it. He immediately promoted me to ~~Technician~~ <sup>Tech</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>No</sup> it was the three stripes with the T on it.

FARLEY:

Okay, technician fourth, wasn't it?

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

WM: That's right, yeah, <sup>T</sup> technician fourth.

FARLEY: Well, that was great to come in with stripes on your arms.

WM: Yeah, that's right, and that enabled me to send as much home, money home as I had been sending. And I never did get basic training.

FARLEY: That was one question I was going to ask.

WM: I never did. <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ came in bits and pieces. I had to take the Army aptitude test in the office under, who was first sergeant then, <sup>Does</sup> Flynn, ~~does~~ that sound right, in the <sup>Second</sup> ~~second~~ <sup>Signal?</sup> ~~signal~~ and I was trucked down to Ft. <sup>Myer</sup> ~~Meyer~~ along with a couple of other guys to get my uniforms, ~~and~~ ~~and that was~~ <sup>That's</sup> ~~that's~~ about all there was until the great day when they moved the Munitions Building to Arlington Hall and all of a sudden heard we're gonna live in barracks.

FARLEY: That was quite a comedown for a lot of people.

WM: And I, by then I was a tech sergeant, <sup>No</sup> ~~probably~~ I was probably was the master sergeant by then, and NCO ACOB and never had a minute's worth of basic.

FARLEY: Was it rough, <sup>?</sup> I mean not completely understanding the left and the right flank and to the rear march and all that, or did you have enough sergeants to tell them to take care of it?

FARLEY: No, I had to do it. <sup>You</sup> ~~you~~ had to run your own barracks, but, you know, one has a quick study and the barracks I inherited was full of these privates who were all Japanese students. <sup>All</sup> ~~all~~ out of places like Yale and Harvard and NYU, <sup>They'd</sup> ~~and they'd~~ never seen more than two stripes while they were in the

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

6

Army<sup>T</sup> had that going for me. Then they found out in short order I had a reputation as a <sup>Cryptanalyst, so</sup> ~~cryptanalyst~~, so there's a lot of respect going there, too. And I'm sure they did a fair amount of covering up for my deficiencies.

FARLEY: How much ~~of~~ of your time was devoted to administration rather than cryptanalysis because you were the senior NCO?

WM: Very little, very little.

FARLEY: So you were able to spend most of your time in Building A or Building B, whichever it was?

WM: Particularly since I was on the swing shift and they <sup>all</sup> were ~~all~~ on day shift.

FARLEY: Okay. So you could handle the administration during the day then <sup>stay until</sup> ~~til~~ midnight?

WM: That's right.

FARLEY: Okay. What sort of an assignment did you get from the Munitions to Arlington Hall? When you moved to Arlington, were you given pretty much the same duties as you had at the SIS in Munitions?

WM: There was a point in time when <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ Japanese problem grew so much that they needed to beef it up and I was transferred from the German section to the Japanese section. I had gotten a lot of notoriety as a depth stripper in German and they had an awful lot of key to recover on the Japanese systems. I'm not sure when I was, though, I guess it was after we flogged the GEE, German Dip System.

FARLEY: Late '42 or?

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
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7

WM: Yeah, *MAA* and that problem was winding down. So I was assigned to the Japanese problem, but Kullback was running that too, at the time. I guess he'd already moved over and I didn't have any administrative duties, I was simply a cryptanalyst, *to* worked swing shift, recovered keys like crazy, and recovered keys that *AAA* they couldn't believe the next day, day after day after day.

FARLEY: Just had that talent, that knack I guess. Was Rowlett involved at all in the Japanese area?

WM: In the Munitions Building yes. In those days we only worked DIP problems *of course* ~~because~~ and then yeah, he ran the Japanese Diplomatic section. I wasn't in that. Security was very good. By osmosis you gathered when they'd broken something, but the details weren't readily apparent and you got the buzz words like MAGIC and PURPLE and the RED machine and so on.

FARLEY: Where those words used pretty much around that area at that time?

WM: Oh yeah, the MAGIC SUMMARY, yeah, and that was clearly the SIS intelligence wrap up that was picked up by courier and hand-carried, but yeah, the buzz word, the PURPLE machine, that's what we called it, the RED machine.

FARLEY: Right. If you were to pick somebody as a mentor or somebody who guided you during that period, who would you say it was?

WM: Oh, it'd be Kullback, *yeah*, I always looked up to him, *and* I

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8

still do.

FARLEY:

Good <sup>old</sup> Solomon, right?

WM:

Yeah. Yeah, he was <sup>unflappably</sup> unflappably, <sup>He</sup> he didn't mince words, <sup>He</sup> he said what he meant, nothing devious or underhanded about him, <sup>and</sup> I always figured, gee, if I ever <sup>have</sup> got to run anything around here that I'd run it the way Kullback did - and I did, the best I could. Kind of no-nonsense, blunt, straight to the point, <sup>and</sup>.

FARLEY:

<sup>Why were</sup> ~~where~~ the big three in uniform by then? <sup>that is?</sup>

WM:

Yeah, that, you know it's all hazy, so much happened so fast in those days, but one day all of sudden there was Abe Sinkov in a uniform and Rowlett in a uniform and Kullback in a uniform, <sup>and they</sup> ~~and they~~ didn't look very military, but there they were in uniforms.

FARLEY:

Especially Abe.

WM:

Yeah, full colonels.

FARLEY:

Yeah, right. And then Abe went to Australia, <sup>in mid '42</sup> ~~in mid '42~~ It was mid '42 wasn't it, or was it earlier than that?

WM:

I think mid '42 is about right.

FARLEY:

What systems do you recall that you were working, on ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> knocking off the additives? Was it 2-4-6-8 or?

WM:

2-4-6-8, 7-8-9-0. I guess those were the two main ones <sup>because</sup> ~~because~~ it was never ending, <sup>About</sup> ~~about~~ the time you recovered all the additive in the book, they put out a new book and there were always key squares to recover and stuff like that.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

9

FARLEY: Was there any morale problem at all with the military at that time, <sup>They</sup> felt that they were working longer than some <sup>civilians</sup> of the civilians and were making less money? Did you notice it in the early days?

WM: Never bothered me. When I enlisted in the Army I forfeited something like, as a civilian, hundreds of hours of compensatory time that I never got to take and when I put on the uniform I didn't change my habits. I worked about 12 hours a day, six or seven days a week, almost never took a day off. <sup>There</sup> there was a war on. Besides I liked what I was doing.

FARLEY: Is there anything else we can put on tape regarding the <sup>cryptanalytical</sup> ~~crypt~~, the analytical period? What I want to do is get to the Japanese where you were sitting and working with Colonel Reischauer.

WM: I didn't work with Reischauer at all. <sup>He</sup> he had the whole language end of it and I was on the crypt end.

FARLEY: Oh I was under the impression that you had been with Reischauer.

WM: No.

FARLEY: George Reddick and couple of other people ~~And~~ <sup>And</sup> thought so.

WM: Nope.

FARLEY: And they said that you were in charge. Did you know him at all?

WM: Oh sure, sure. ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> had character everybody, Reischauer. But no, he had the job of running the big translation

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

effort on the Japanese, <sup>10</sup> heading up all the book-breaking and training all these young GIs who he hoped to beat into linguists, Japanese linguists. He was a very busy man. And I had nothing to do with that end of it. ~~the~~ The book-breaking and the translation was kept very very separate from the depth stripping ~~and the~~ and the recovery ~~recovery~~ of code charts.

FARLEY:

How closely did you work with the translators, ~~at all~~

If you had a problem or if you could help them or they could help you, how close was the liaison?

WM:

It was sort of on a who-you-know basis. <sup>They'd</sup> ~~they'd~~ come to me and ask if this recovery might not be correct or I'd go to them and say, this group hasn't been noted yet and yet I think it exists and it ought to mean so and so and that kind of thing. But that would be because some of the guys I was doing business with were guys in my barracks, <sup>That</sup> ~~and that~~ would lead to other contacts who would seek me out. But most of that work was done by day and there I was from swing until the wee hours of the morning.

FARLEY:

Was liaison discouraged among the various elements in the building?

WM:

No, it's just that everybody had so much to do that there was <sup>no</sup> ~~not~~ time to develop generalists, people who saw small pieces of all the action.

FARLEY:

How much machines or, well, what did they call them in those days, I guess it was early for computers, but how

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

11

much machine assistance did you receive?

WM: IBM

FARLEY: Yeah and the ~~old~~ <sup>old</sup> National Cash Register equipments, <sup>? How</sup> how much help, <sup>and of</sup> what value were those in '42 and '43?

WM: Oh, they were quite valuable until ~~they~~ we got IBM and ~~they~~ <sup>we</sup> were able to sort and collate. We couldn't have gotten very far hence the German Dip and of course they ran the SIS on the mere <sup>a</sup> ~~mere~~ <sup>pittance</sup> ~~pittance~~ <sup>and part</sup> of the reason <sup>we</sup> went on swing shift was so we could use the IBM setup in the, I guess it's the adjutant general's section. I forget what they called it then, logistics. Anyhow we used to go down about 4:30 - 5:00 when they got through and run all the sorters and <sup>collators</sup> ~~collators~~ and everything else right into the ground. Sometimes ~~we'd~~ we'd render inoperable four, five, six pieces of machinery, but we'd get our job done. <sup>We'd</sup> we'd go back upstairs and I don't know what they thought of us when they had to clean up the next morning, troubleshooting all that stuff. But gradually we got our own IBM facility in the Munitions Building. I guess it was Rowlett who ~~they~~ was sort of an electromechanical genius as well as a cryptanalyst. He put some things together, one of which was the GEE WHIZER, ~~yeah~~ <sup>It was</sup> a way to solve transpositions mechanically by log <sup>weights</sup> ~~weight~~ <sup>and</sup>.

FARLEY: Did you ever, in the earlier days, feed anything into the Bombes or were all the Bombes in Europe for the Enigma?

WM: No, I think ~~they~~ we got one, but this is hearsay on my

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

part because by then I was in the ~~CBS~~ <sup>#</sup> CBI.

FARLEY: Sir, do you remember the organization structure of the period, mid '42s that you were involved in?

WM: Not very well because even now I see nomenclature, two capital B, small roman numeral and a small letter and I for the life of me can't attach any significant<sup>ce</sup>~~es~~ at all.

FARLEY: You can't, no.

WM: I can't even give you the wheels who <sup>were</sup> running various things. I know Kullback was running the whole Japanese problem and ~~Reichauer~~ <sup>Reichauer</sup> ~~was~~ under him was running the language part of it. But I don't know who was directly below Kullback on the crypt end, who I should speak to. I don't think I ever saw the guy. I don't know who he was.

FARLEY: Yeah. ~~Lambros~~ <sup>Lambros</sup> didn't come in until '43 did he, do you remember?

WM: Yeah, in those days he spent his time mostly in Friedman's office and it was in the Headquarters Building, <sup>He had</sup> very little, almost nothing to do with operations.

FARLEY: Yeah, I first remember him in mid '43, so I guess he'd been around there for a while.

WM: And that was about the time I guess I got shipped to the <sup>CBI</sup>

FARLEY: ~~Was~~ <sup>Was</sup> Colonel Arrell, ~~was he~~ a linguist?

WM: Oh yes, yes he was. He may have been in charge and then ~~Reichauer~~ <sup>Reichauer</sup> worked for him.

FARLEY: Could be.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

13

WM: Yeah of course it was Colonel <sup>Aurel,</sup> Arret, a chicken colonel, and I don't think <sup>Reichauer</sup> ~~Rieshauer~~ was at that time.

FARLEY: I don't recall. Oh I agree that's a long time ago, kinda <sup>of</sup> hard to sort it out. Shall we move to CBI now or is there anything else that you'd like to talk about still at Arlington Hall? Okay, did you volunteer to go to the CBI or were you <sup>sent</sup> sent?

WM: Oh no, no, I was ordered. There was a time when a lot of the guys were volunteering for OCS and going and coming back as lieutenants. <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ Kullback called me in his office one day <sup>said,</sup> "Sergeant Lutwiniak, <sup>I</sup> figured he was mad at me. I <sup>said,</sup> <sup>yes</sup> ~~say~~ <sup>He</sup> <sup>said,</sup> "I'm ordering you to go to OCS." I said, "I don't want to, why should I waste three months when I can be solving all these things and stripping all this key? I'm not <sup>going to</sup> ~~gonna~~ be more valuable to you as a lieutenant than I am as a sergeant." <sup>He</sup> <sup>said,</sup> "I'm ordering ~~you~~ you." I said, <sup>No,</sup> <sup>no,</sup> "I'm not." <sup>I</sup> <sup>saluted</sup> and I walked out. It was shortly after that I got orders to go CBI. I don't think there's any connection. I think the Pacific war was getting to the point where they had <sup>to</sup> <sup>augment</sup> the very small effort they had in New Delhi and I was one of a group of how many others there were, eight.

FARLEY: What date was this, do you remember, was it in '43?

WM: I think that's right.

FARLEY: That would be early '43.

WM: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

14

FARLEY: How did they select them? Were they all, quote, "volunteered" or they needed certain specialties?

WM: Well let's see. Two of us were cryptanalysts, Dirth? ~~(288)~~ and Lutwiniak, <sup>One</sup> ~~one~~ was a traffic analyst ~~named~~ Pickering, two were Japanese linguists named Henley and, what the hell was that other guy's name, <sup>? Another</sup> ~~another~~ COMSECer named Murphy. <sup>It</sup> ~~It~~ was just sort of a slice of the cryptologic talent, all GIs, all non coms.

FARLEY: What was your directive, what did they tell you to do, <sup>?</sup> ~~to~~ To go over and setup a SIGINT intelligence service support element, ~~or?~~ or what?

WM: No. We were carrying sealed orders. But <sup>getting</sup> ~~getting~~ there was some deal. Started out <sup>getting</sup> ~~getting~~ on a train in Washington and going clear across the country to some camp in California. <sup>We</sup> ~~and we~~ stopped there for I guess a month then we went up to Northern California, Camp <sup>Stoneman</sup> ~~Spoman~~, yeah outside of Pittsburgh. Sat there for another month. ~~we~~ We heard they were building our <sup>Liberty</sup> ~~LIBERTY~~ ship. <sup>Then</sup> ~~then~~ got shipped south to Ansa <sup>(?)</sup> and finally got on this <sup>Liberty</sup> ~~LIBERTY~~ ship which was brand new. We got ~~off~~ aboard and they went around the hull but once, that was the shake-down <sup>cruise</sup> ~~crews~~, and <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ lighted out for India, by way of Australia, underneath ~~unbeneath~~ Australia, unescorted.

FARLEY: Two months trip, <sup>?</sup> ~~how~~ <sup>How</sup> long did it take?

WM: Two months. One stop <sup>Hobart, Tasmania</sup> ~~Hobart, Tasmania~~ take on fresh water and vegetables, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ it was a cargo ship <sup>it and</sup> ~~it was~~ was

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

15

loaded with munitions, and <sup>On</sup> deck were crates, I think they were P-38 fighters, <sup>that was dubbed</sup> ~~and there~~ <sup>There</sup> were two what we called dog houses right on deck, one on each <sup>side</sup> of the ship and <sup>in</sup> those dog houses were ensconced, eight sergeants on one side and eight sergeants on the other. The eight sergeants on the other side were all ~~our wess~~ <sup>OSS</sup> men, <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ were just as close-mouthed as ~~we~~ <sup>we</sup> were. After we'd been at sea I forget how long, I guess we'd

already crossed the equator and gotten initiated into the "Royal Order of Shellbacks". <sup>One</sup> ~~royal order of shellbacks~~ and one of my chores was to take a bucket and climb up at the crow's nest and get the eggs.

FARLEY: What a mess.

WM: The guy in charge of nominally, your transportation officer, <sup>a</sup> lieutenant, very strange name, his name was Larder, his initials were <sup>MT</sup> ~~MP~~. They called us out on deck one sunny <sup>day</sup> and said "I'm gonna renew your orders men, ~~and~~ I <sup>whispered</sup> ~~dispered~~ to the guy next to me, <sup>Our</sup> ~~our~~ orders are to report to the SIS in New Delhi, India." <sup>He</sup> ~~and~~ he reads his orders, <sup>"You</sup> ~~you~~ report to the SIS building in New Delhi, India."

FARLEY: Oh you had known that you were going there?

WM: Why, sure.

FARLEY: Oh yeah, okay.

WM: They tried to keep it a secret, <sup>but</sup> ~~but~~ <sup>guys</sup> The OSS ~~guy~~ didn't know. But I don't think they were going to New Delhi, they probably went to Burma, <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ never saw them after. After we landed in Calcutta, we never saw them again.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Koenpore (?)

But from Calcutta we were trucked to a barracks, ~~Cora~~  
~~Atta~~ comes to mind. I don't know if that's the right  
name, but it was on a lush golf course where we had an  
intercept station. I can recall visiting at the intercept  
station during our stay there. But then we got trucked  
up to ~~the barracks~~ <sup>or</sup> were we flown? <sup>No,</sup> ~~no,~~ I guess we went  
by train probably, to New Delhi and lived in tents for a  
while until we got barracks in town and checked into the  
Munitions <sup>SIS</sup> Building and went to work.

FARLEY:

Did <sup>What</sup> ~~what~~ sort of an operation was already there for SIS?

WM:

Very small one. ~~It~~ <sup>It</sup> was skeletal. The guy in charge  
was a Major Martan and he was responsible for all the  
usual things, <sup>S</sup> signals, intelligence. <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ was understaffed  
~~and~~ <sup>had</sup> almost no equipment. ~~and~~ I was horrified to find  
out that the systems he was promulgating in the CBI  
Theatre were double-transposition systems with literal  
keys for deriving T1 and T2, instructions for use, you  
know, don't fill the matrix and things like that. ~~and~~ <sup>had</sup>

and had

I thought that was pathetic because I <sup>had</sup> a lot of experience  
on transposition systems <sup>as</sup> ~~is~~ used by the German spies in  
South America. ~~and~~ I knew how subject they were to abuse  
and it just doesn't stand up. And they had a series of  
related things from which the derived keys, English  
phrases <sup>say, if</sup> ~~say, if~~ you know, if you made a recovery, you  
could recover the two keys. <sup>The</sup> ~~the~~ literal keys <sup>and</sup> see how they're  
related and get an idea. <sup>Gradually</sup> ~~and gradually~~ I could just see

~~TOP SECRET~~

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our stuff being ripped to pieces and yet what else could he do? <sup>He</sup> he had no material ~~to~~ to get our good systems or anything else. They greeted us, boy they greeted us because that meant they were free to go back to the States.

FARLEY: Is that right, they had served their time over there, <sup>7</sup> ~~over~~

WM: Yeah.

*leave. They must have*

FARLEY: That's unusual that they would let them ~~if they had~~ accumulated their numbers of points. ~~over~~

WM: Well no I think they had two or three years in, <sup>and</sup> they simply were due to be replaced. <sup>Our CO</sup> ~~was~~ was Leonard, colonel, yeah lieutenant colonel then, and later chicken colonel. Major ~~Bickwit~~ ~~Bickwit~~ ~~Bickwit~~ ~~Bickwit~~ Bickwit.

FARLEY: Oh yeah.

WM: He was <sup>a</sup> major in the Munitions Building, I guess. <sup>you know</sup> ~~that~~ ~~that~~ reminds me of an incident. When he came on board to take over the swing shift in the Munitions Building, ~~He~~ <sup>He</sup> had ~~a~~ <sup>grown</sup> grown by then, enough so it needed an officer-in-charge. He came in one evening and he had ~~it~~ an intercepted cryptogram from, I guess it was one of the spy networks in South America. <sup>He</sup> ~~He~~ said, <sup>"Here,</sup> here, Bill, see what you can do with this, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ he just tossed it on my desk. Well it was transposition, ~~it~~ <sup>It</sup> it was single transposition, ~~it~~ it had a lot of X's in it and then, <sup>in</sup> ~~and~~ rather short order I put the thing together, solved it. <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ was English. <sup>Something</sup> ~~something~~ about a ship movement and cargo out of some port in South America and its destination. ~~and~~ I put it back on his desk

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and he looked at, <sup>and</sup> he said, <sup>18</sup> "Very good, Bill." And I went back to work, <sup>when</sup> but he <sup>when</sup> he turned up in the CBI <sup>as</sup> as Lieutenant Colonel Bickwit, Chief Signal Officer of the Theatre. <sup>I guess he</sup> ~~(414)~~ I remembered that and I wound up sort of running the whole crypt effort. There was a nominal captain in charge, Stowbridge, <sup>Sound</sup> ~~sound~~ right?

FARLEY:

Yes. That's what I heard from three or <sup>four</sup> people who were there that you ran the operation.

WM:

Yeah. And ~~at that~~ <sup>was</sup> I'm sure this is all connected, Bickwit just simply impressed with me, <sup>a</sup> ~~that the~~ <sup>who</sup> guy knows what he's doing and saw to it that I was giving a fairly free hand, ~~and~~ I never asked for permission. All the supplies I asked for I got right away and things like that. And I <sup>never</sup> ~~would have~~ worried about <sup>anything</sup> ~~you know~~ <sup>It</sup> seemed natural <sup>to</sup> ~~of~~ me, <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ were <sup>getting</sup> ~~getting~~ the job done and it's only in retrospect that I see that <sup>you know</sup> ~~this~~ this had to be <sup>kind of</sup> kind of <sup>kind of</sup> planned and made to happen that way.

FARLEY:

Did you reorganize the group when you took over or was there any need to do anything?

WM:

~~There wasn't,~~ <sup>It</sup> ~~it~~ seems to me it was sort of <sup>oh chaotic,</sup> ~~chaotic,~~ I guess is the right word, and I had some very good people, and <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ simply sorted things out by function and allocated functions for people and kind <sup>of</sup> ~~a~~ put it on a sort of a assembly line basis. <sup>In</sup> ~~in~~ fact, we moved people around so that everybody could do everything after a while. And ~~you~~ ~~know~~ got it sort in a smooth flowing thing, <sup>and</sup> ~~I~~ I orchestrated

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

19

the whole bit. I was in charge of all the incoming and outgoing key recoveries and I kept all the records up to date and I provided all the working aids, all the recoveries of code groups and keys and things like that and just kept things running ~~smoothly~~ smoothly.

FARLEY: What systems were your target, were they all Japanese, medium ~~length~~ level?

WM: Yeah. Not at the beginning, we worked the Japanese main lines. The ones that had particular impact on the CBI Theatre, SMAT, and I forget what that breaks down to, that 6, 7, 7,8,9,0?

FARLEY: I don't know, I believe so, right. And that was the main line. Was there a heavy volume of traffic or were you able to just hear three or four stations?

WM: Well, we had an intercept station right outside Delhi. I forget the number, ~~and we~~ <sup>We</sup> also got traffic from the one outside of Calcutta. Seems to me we had one in Burma, one in China.

FARLEY: And they'd feed all the traffic to you people?

WM: It got to us, yes. We were reading the main lines currently and we were grinding out very good intelligence in support of I guess by then ~~the main line~~ <sup>at present</sup> "Half pint." It would be Joe Stillwell's boy. <sup>They'd</sup> and they'd come every month's change of the square, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>Sometimes</sup> sometimes it would take three, four days before we got it from <sup>the</sup> big effort at Arlington Hall. So one night Paul Derthick <sup>with</sup> ~~with~~ and me and a sergeant named Jack Lauberman figured

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out that if we could get the traffic in early we could recover the square probably that night. We got Stowbridge in, our Captain Stowbridge, commandeered a jeep and we ran a sort of a <sup>Courier</sup> query into the intercept station outside Delhi and kept bringing in the traffic during the night, ~~and I recall~~ <sup>Derthick</sup> and I would take the preamble stuff and start trying to solve the square change and about 3:30-4:00 in the morning we had just enough traffic to put it all together. ~~and I recall~~ <sup>Derthick</sup> I recall saying gee, ~~you know~~ <sup>There's</sup> we should probably send this back to Washington, ~~there's~~ <sup>We</sup> no sense them going through the agony of recovering, ~~but we~~ <sup>got</sup> a hold of, who was the COMSEC sergeant, Jim Geeseman, Sergeant Geeseman, and ~~asked~~ <sup>asked</sup> him to send it back to Arlington Hall. And he said, <sup>Well,</sup> "well," it was the Sigaba we used, <sup>It</sup> no numbers on it, very hard. "I said, <sup>Well,</sup> ~~well~~ all right we'll spell out all the numbers, spell out all the rows, digit by digit, and then ~~as a check~~ <sup>as a check</sup> spell out all the columns," <sup>So</sup> and ~~so~~ it wound up to be a sizeable piece of thing. ~~And he said,~~ <sup>And he said,</sup> "Well, <sup>well</sup> who does this go to?" I said, <sup>well</sup> ~~well~~ <sup>to</sup> Kullback from Lutwiniak, <sup>And</sup> ~~and~~ we sent it. And a day later we got a message back from Kullback to Lutwiniak, <sup>Your</sup> ~~your~~ mission out there is to exploit systems not to recover them, <sup>Don't</sup> ~~don't~~ do that again," he said. And I, you know, ~~we~~ <sup>we</sup> we'd spent the rest of the night celebrating, got a bottle of wine and - -  
 FARLEY: Something to celebrate.  
 WM: Yeah, but, then we got that slap in the face. It wasn't

~~TOP SECRET~~

and  
 until I got back, I found out what had happened. A guy named, civilian named Cassidy who was running the Jap problem back here, when that square came in just got into a towering tissy, "How dare they? That's not their job!" And Kullback, the only way he could mollify the guy was to send this reprimand back to me.

FARLEY:

That's a shame. Guys so shortsighted, <sup>the</sup> that the war should come first.

WM:

Well I think Kully knew I would take it all right. Bickwick just smiled when he handed it to me. He said, "Don't pay any attention to this, Bill." Next time the square changes you guys can do it overnight like you did, go do it. Next time we won't send it."

FARLEY:

What support did you get from Arlington Hall?

WM:

Oh, all the keys as they recovered them and so on. They used to come rolling. Gee, a large part of my job was simply taking these decrypts. <sup>We</sup> had type X which we could use for the keys, <sup>We want</sup> ~~was to~~ take these decrypts and write them up on the 5x8 cards with the proper row designators and columns designators and page designators and <sup>Keep</sup> ~~keep~~ those things up to date and <sup>have them</sup> ~~them~~ available for the guys <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ were doing the exploitation and the decryption. Sometimes a key page would be sketchily recovered and we'd have a message that was very interesting and if we had something around, <sup>where</sup> ~~well~~ we had two deep, we'd try to fill in the unrecovered keys just to complete the translations. <sup>That</sup> ~~that~~ kind of recovery we did.

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FARLEY: Switch to Side 2.

FARLEY: How about support from Central Bureau in Australia, did you have any liaison or any channel to the Australians or the Sinkov, <sup>Gerhard, Erskine, and</sup> ~~Gerhardt, Ersk and that~~ crew?

WM: I heard several times directly from Abe Sinkov, but whether ~~they~~ there were official communications and an exchange that way I have no idea. <sup>That</sup> ~~that~~ would have been done at the <sup>officer</sup> ~~office~~ level and I didn't pay much attention to that. There was a British group, WEC, in the area and they came down on occasion to talk to us and we went out there to talk to them. I recall one effort they had which they said was working very well of teaching South African natives how to intercept Japanese traffic by poking the right keys on <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ typewriter to correspond with what they heard <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ eves. They said it was working very well in spite of the fact you couldn't get <sup>them</sup> ~~them~~ to use a typewriter with their intercept. <sup>All</sup> ~~you know~~ <sup>all</sup> their stuff was always in pencil or the red form sheets.

FARLEY: Yeah, right, right, and it worked?

WM: They said so, I remember being amazed. They had one guy who <sup>was sitting</sup> ~~was sitting~~ there with earphones and <sup>typing away and</sup> ~~typing away and~~ producing pretty nice looking traffic. Of course it wasn't in a live situation.

FARLEY: Who did you support in New Delhi, the U. S. Commander, <sup>?</sup> ~~what was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ it Stillwell?

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

WM: No, he was in ~~the~~ charge of the troops in Burma. I don't know who the local CO, maybe if you threw some names I may could verify them.

FARLEY: I don't know, I don't know. You wouldn't recall the G-2 or the officer to whom you provided the material? Let me ask again, you produced translations or reports or summaries. ~~what~~ <sup>How</sup> ~~did~~ you get your product into the hands of the G-2?

WM: We produced decrypts which went over to the translation guys, Henley and Frank Tenney and Bernie Wiseburger, that was the sergeant who <sup>was on the</sup> shift with us. I couldn't remember <sup>his</sup> ~~the name~~. ~~of~~ And they'd been augmented, people kept coming in all time, we kept growing and growing. And they'd translate them and the translations, <sup>as near as</sup> ~~the years~~ I could tell would go straight to the CO, <sup>Bick with,</sup> ~~Bick with,~~ and he'd do the ~~desemination~~ dissemination.

FARLEY: I see. So would you guess that he made a daily run or a courier?

WM: Well somebody certainly did, somebody certainly did, but I have no idea who ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> put the finger on. But I know the support to Stillwell was crucial several times. I think the intelligence we provided had a hell of a lot to do with the Battle of Michenor <sup>Myit Kyina</sup> coming up the way it did, and <sup>It</sup> it seems to me that Flip <sup>(Lokan's) glider</sup> ~~Corcoran's glider~~ <sup>Corcoran's glider</sup> ~~crew~~ <sup>crew</sup> owed their lives to us, too. And, you know, that's a funny thing. After I got back I met the woman I married at a party.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

Some years later her high school biology teacher was in town and he looked her up, invited us there. <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ went to a party <sup>and it</sup> turned out that this guy was one of Flip ~~Jordan's~~ <sup>Jordan's</sup> pilots and he wouldn't be talking to me if I, you know ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> I didn't tell him, of course, but I told her. She still can't get over it.

Corcoran's

FARLEY:

You were able to read information that the Japanese were aware of their operations or ~~could you~~ <sup>do you</sup> remember enough about it to put it on tape?

WM:

No, I don't. <sup>Ge, they're</sup> ~~that~~ it's a shame none of those translators stuck around, ~~they're~~ <sup>they're</sup> the guys you ought to talk to.

FARLEY:

Yes.

WM:

Because we recovered and decrypted in Japanese and while all of us knew all kinds of common Japanese terms, enough to know when we were reading things properly, we weren't translators. <sup>We would</sup> ~~we'd~~ have to take their word for it. <sup>That's</sup> ~~that's~~ "hot stuff, <sup>you've got to</sup> ~~you've got to~~ get that out."

FARLEY:

You had somebody scan it then when you had a <sup>sketchy</sup> ~~sketchy~~ item?

WM:

Oh yeah, they'd come in and look over our shoulders lot of times when things were kinda <sup>of</sup> hard and we needed help on stripping. See, if the keys weren't recovered and the message was important and we had some other traffic around that fit on that page, the shallow depth, you needed all the help you could get to strip it out <sup>because</sup> ~~cause~~ you couldn't wait another two weeks until Arlington Hall sent that particular page to you. And the interplay there was

important and there were times when the traffic was ~~#~~ important  
~~like~~ like <sup>Myit Kyina</sup> ~~Mitchener~~ and some other Burmese operations when  
two or three of those guys would almost live in the same  
office with us while we sweated these things out <sup>and they would</sup> snatch  
it <sup>it as</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>and</sup> soon as it's done ~~or~~ run across the hall and  
translate it.

FARLEY: Most of the information was pretty perishable then on  
~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> main line?

WM: Well, you know the Burmese campaign was a small thing  
compared to what was going on in Southwest Pacific and  
what was going on in Europe, but <sup>there</sup> ~~they~~ were GIs involved  
and, yeah, it was important. <sup>Bickwith</sup> ~~Bickwith~~ got some kind of a  
decoration out of it for our support. I don't think it  
was a routine <sup>Legion of Merit</sup> ~~Legion of Merit~~ or something like that.

FARLEY: He should have.

WM: I can recall, I'm coming in the office and reading  
communications from <sup>"Half Pint"</sup> ~~Half Pint~~ Stillwell, ~~and~~ simply  
congratulating us on the support we were giving them.  
So, yeah, we were doing good things which is why we worked  
around the clock.

FARLEY: That's another one I was going to ask. You did get  
feedback from the people you were supporting? <sup>other than</sup> compliments,  
saying <sup>Give</sup> ~~Give~~ us more of this, what do you have on? <sup>"..."</sup>

WM: Well it was the compliments that would be read to us. <sup>I</sup>  
<sup>assumed that</sup> ~~yeah~~ <sup>I assume that</sup> ~~largely this~~ ~~was~~ was orchestrated by Bickwith  
~~Bickwith~~ If you knew the guy you realize that he'd be

~~TOP SECRET~~

26

the front man, ~~you know~~ getting all the credit and handling the consumers and things like that.

FARLEY: Did you have specific EEIs or as we used to call <sup>them,</sup> PROD requirements, but earlier it was EEIs, <sup>? Did</sup> ~~did~~ you get some guidance, precise guidance from the G-2 people or the intelligence officers?

WM: I couldn't say, really, I was a cryptanalyst.

FARLEY: I know, but I ~~think~~ <sup>thought</sup> in retrospect maybe you'd recall, ~~okay.~~

WM: We had a lot of <sup>officers</sup> ~~offices~~ who ~~must~~ <sup>have</sup> been doing something; they sure weren't doing any of the real work.

FARLEY: You were probably just told to give us as much intelligence as you can. Did you ever have the feeling that you were sort of step children out in the CBI, <sup>? The</sup> ~~the~~ Bletchley Park people and the Central Bureau, <sup>people</sup> and then oh yeah, there's an outfit out in India?

WM: No because the job was big enough to occupy us. <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ never had enough resources, never had enough men to do everything that needed doing. You don't worry about things like that. Later on when I got back and I <sup>saw</sup> what was going on in other places, yeah, I figured it was a pretty small operation and not of much interest.

FARLEY: What other officers were there besides <sup>Bickwit</sup> ~~Beckwith~~ and Latapus?

WM: <sup>Bickwit</sup> Bickwith Stowbridge, there's a Cameron Hosmer, Orlando W. Stevenson <sup>Pizurki</sup> III, Captain ~~Razerky~~ <sup>Pizurki</sup>, Jerky ~~Pazerky~~ <sup>Pizurki</sup> we called him. <sup>Oh</sup> ~~oh~~ God, what a pistol. He got into a hell of a mess. I guess he was on leave and got up to the Northern

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

27

part of India where it borders on Afganistan and they tell me he stepped across the border and pulled out his .45.

FARLEY: Crazy.

WM: Yeah. Jerky <sup>Pizurki.</sup> ~~Razetky~~

FARLEY: Did it cost him anything?

WM: I guess he got a reprimand. Later on <sup>(when)</sup> we finally got an IBM setup, a lieutenant named <sup>E Regnan,</sup> ~~E Kogran,~~ headed that up.

FARLEY: When did Lambros ~~come~~ come out there as a chief of some section?

WM: I really couldn't tell you what he was really <sup>He</sup> didn't bother me, I know that. It was kind of late in the day, I think we were <sup>already</sup> ~~already~~ counting down when he came out.

FARLEY: Well let's talk about Mainline 6666, water transport.

WM: Yeah, that's right.

FARLEY: 7755

WM: Yeah, we worked on those.

FARLEY: What did you get out of the water transport, do you recall?

WM: On the end product end I couldn't tell you.

FARLEY: Yeah, that right, that's the rough part. You just ground out the groups. ~~and~~

WM: That's right, that's right, and we got guidance from the linguists on what was important, what was hot traffic ~~it~~ and what wasn't, <sup>and we</sup> ~~and~~ we knew the keywords which would indicate messages of interest. Like on <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ water transport, we knew the ports that they were very interested in, ~~and~~ the ports which would be supplying Burma and we'd give

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

28

that kind of traffic priority.

FARLEY: Also my notes mentions two companies, one was the 3147th Sig Service Company, and <sup>was</sup> was there another one? I couldn't find any reference to a second one. <sup>?</sup> Was that your outfit, 3147th?

WM: Those are numbers I never heard ~~of~~ before.

FARLEY: Is that right?

WM: Never heard of them before.

FARLEY: You were also acting <sup>F</sup> first <sup>S</sup> sergeant out there, too, weren't you, or <sup>F</sup> first <sup>S</sup> sergeant, not acting?

WM: For a while, yeah, I was the ranking guy in the camp, I guess and somebody had to be that.

FARLEY: So you managed the troops as well as <sup>other</sup> other duties?

WM: Well yeah by then I knew my way around the Army. No, in New Delhi <sup>Proper</sup> ~~proprietor~~ (156) we had a first sergeant named Myron, T. <sup>He</sup> was from Provo, Utah, I remember that. <sup>His</sup> first name was Myron, I remember that. I can't think of his last name. No, I didn't <sup>realize</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>realize that</sup> they had broken the thing down into units.

FARLEY: Yeah, there was a reference to 3147th, Sig Service Company. Were you right at the Headquarters, SIS?

WM: Yes.

FARLEY: What did they call it Cannaught Circle, or?

WM: That sounds right, Cannaught Circle.

FARLEY: But you were right at the Headquarters, SIS?

WM: It was a building, <sup>a</sup> of small two or three white building, we were on the ground floor.

~~TOP SECRET~~ — HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

29

FARLEY: Was there any security at all? <sup>Did</sup> ~~did~~ you have guards and barbed wire fence or anything of that type?

WM: Well ~~they~~ there was <sup>wrought</sup> ~~rod~~ iron grill work on the windows on the lower floor, but that's about all, and guards.

FARLEY: Did you have any identification procedure, badges, or personal recognition? What was it to permit people in?

WM: Personal recognition, I guess, yeah. <sup>There</sup> ~~There~~ were ID cards and <sup>you'd</sup> ~~you'd~~ be asked to display these sometimes. ~~but~~ I don't recall we had badges with pictures on and everything like that. <sup>too</sup> ~~too~~ fancy.

FARLEY: That's right, that's right, your dog tags probably.

WM: And the barracks were just a couple of blocks away from the building, the in-town barracks.

FARLEY: And you had a mess hall, <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ had your own cooks and bakers there?

WM: Yeah, yeah.

FARLEY: Was the food palatable?

WM: Well, swing shift you know, you made do.

FARLEY: Oh yeah, you'd bring your own fresh eggs, anything you want after midnight, right? You mentioned ~~the~~ the British. Did the British come over and visit us as often as we did them or was there any interchange at all?

WM: I really couldn't say. I know that on one occasion they ~~would~~ came down to talk probably low-grade systems and that's when I got to talk to them. And on two occasions we went out there to talk to them about <sup>Gee</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>Gee</sup> I'm not sure,

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

the division of effort, I guess. But I suspect most of the liaison that took place was ~~officer to officer~~ <sup>officer to officer</sup> ~~there~~ and it just didn't involve the working guys.

FARLEY: Probably.

WM: And only when they got down to the nitty-gritty would we be aware that there was this liaison going on, ~~and there~~ <sup>There</sup> may have been an awful lot of it, I just don't know.

FARLEY: Sure. How about people from Arlington Hall, any cryptanalysts?

WM: Never saw them.

FARLEY: Okay, they didn't come out.

WM: They didn't <sup>do</sup> TDY, ~~those~~ <sup>Those</sup> that came stayed.

FARLEY: They wouldn't let them go back, huh?

WM: Well they came because they were assigned.

FARLEY: How about the people from the U. S. Navy, <sup>?</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>Was</sup> there any U. S. Navy operations in New Delhi, SIS type?

WM: Not that I know of, not that I know of. If there were, they sure kept it ~~quite~~ quiet.

FARLEY: Were you aware at that time of the conflict, the friction between <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ Army SIGINTers and the Navy SIGINTers?

WM: Oh yeah, that's from the Munition Building days, sure. The big hassle while we decided how to split up the work on <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ PURPLE machine and things like that.

FARLEY: Odd days, even days?

WM: That's right. And don't forget the Munitions Building was right next to the Navy Building connected by a catwalk

on the second floor, ~~and~~ I can recall going over to the Navy Building <sup>to</sup> do various kind of business.

FARLEY:

~~Right~~ It was not encouraged as I recall.

WM:

I don't know that it was discouraged, <sup>It</sup> ~~but~~ seems to me that they got along <sup>reasonably</sup> ~~reasonably~~ well, with some friction because people ~~had~~ had sort of ~~squatters'~~ "squatters' rights" on various things. But I know they were impressed with us and we with them. ~~All~~ <sup>All</sup> pros, all good people, dedicated to what ~~they~~ <sup>they</sup> were doing and it means an awful lot in this business.

FARLEY:

Is it because of the high level troopers that the jealousy, envy, whatever you want to call it, the high level troopers on the Army side and the Navy side, is that what <sup>precipitated</sup> ~~precipitated~~ this friction? I know at the lower level the troops would interchange information. <sup>That was</sup> ~~there's~~ no problem ~~there~~.

WM:

Sure, yeah I think it was purely politics on the upper level, <sup>Who</sup> ~~who~~ was <sup>going to</sup> gonna swallow whom, is really what it amounted to and the Navy, always traditionally smaller with less funding than the Army and the Army threatening to take them over, the Navy resisting. And maybe some foresight it's all worrying about the day <sup>that</sup> ~~they~~ a merger would take place.

FARLEY:

Uh huh.

WM:

You ~~know~~ <sup>When</sup> when your empire is at risk, ~~yeah~~ you can get awful <sup>ornery</sup> ~~hoosers~~.

FARLEY:

Toward the end of the war did things sort of taper down, <sup>Was</sup> ~~was~~ there less traffic or less volume, information to work?

~~TOP SECRET~~

32

WM: Oh yes, yeah, we were sort of given "make work" <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ were sent hundreds and hundreds of depths on a Japanese air system that needed recovering, I guess they couldn't man it at Arlington Hall and sent them out to us and we stripped the stuff to a <sup>fair three</sup> ~~fairly~~ well, and sent back recoveries, <sup>Had</sup> ~~had~~ to learn a whole new jargon and new vocabulary, groups for airplanes and things. But that was sort of "make work" <sup>and had</sup> ~~at~~ had very little operational value to us. <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ just did it when there was nothing else to do and ~~it~~ as the months wore on there was nothing else to do but that.

FARLEY: How much support did you get in the way of collateral, captured codebooks, captured <sup>materials?</sup> ~~materials?~~

WM: Oh, that came through very fast, ~~it~~ <sup>gist</sup> the ~~gist~~ of it electrically and photostats ~~delivered~~ by courier. Yeah, when the Southwest Pacific campaign picked up and they started making captures of documents, the stuff got to us fairly rapidly, I would say.

FARLEY: Were there any materials captured in Burma or in the India area, do you recall?

WM: That rings a bell, but you know I just can't <sup>remember.</sup> ~~put any in.~~

FARLEY: Would the British provide you anything if they had captured useful material; would they have provided <sup>it</sup> ~~it~~?

WM: I'm sure they would, after all <sup>the WEC-SIS-Delhi</sup> ~~they dug the WEC-SIS~~ ~~Delhi~~ liaison had to have some substance to it. I'm sure they weren't just serving each other tea. But I simply wasn't privy to that kind of thing.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

33

FARLEY: Sure. Was there a TICOM effort out of New Delhi after the Japanese surrendered?

WM: Yeah I think that's what guys like <sup>Callimahos</sup> ~~Callimahos~~ (250) and some others <sup>who</sup> ~~who~~ either volunteered or hadn't had enough time to rotate yet, were kept busy at. I was long gone by then so I couldn't give you the details. But some of them stayed on, gee, a year or more after we got out, mostly traveling.

FARLEY: You must have had enough points toward the end of the war to come back home hadn't you, overseas?

WM: Oh yeah, we no sooner got out of New Delhi, flew to <sup>Karachi</sup> ~~Garatony~~ and got on a troop ship, debarked in Hoboken I guess it was, took a train to Dix and <sup>demobilized</sup> ~~demobilized~~ three <sup>? demobilized? demobilized</sup> days later.

FARLEY: Did you. That was <sup>late</sup> ~~late~~ '45?

WM: <sup>1945, my</sup> ~~15, October 31, 1945, my~~ discharge says "October <sup>37</sup> ~~31~~, 1945."

FARLEY: <sup>Error</sup> Typist huh?

WM: It should be ~~the~~ the 27<sup>th</sup>.

FARLEY: ~~I didn't know whether it was 31 or 27, cryptanalytic minds, like well I won't tell you stories, I'm going to interview you. Is there anything else about New Delhi or about your unit in New Delhi that you should put on tape for our historians, <sup>anecdotes</sup> ~~antodotes~~, anything that you want, that are useful? Was it an enjoyable two years?~~

WM: <sup>From</sup> ~~Oh, I, well, from~~ a personal standpoint, I never could adjust to India as a country, the way it was in those

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

34

days because you'd have the most abject poverty, absolutely  
 squalor, ~~squalor~~ <sup>squalor</sup> terrible sanitary conditions, <sup>check by Jowl</sup> ~~check by Jowl~~ <sup>Chek Wy Jow? (280)</sup>  
 was the most opulent magnificence you could imagine and  
 that hit me so hard when I first saw it I never got over  
 it. No, I didn't enjoy ~~at~~ India at all. I ~~refused~~ <sup>refused</sup> to  
 travel in the country. I wouldn't even take my authorized  
<sup>furlough</sup> ~~furlough~~ to go to rest camps up in the hills in the hot  
 weather. I never went to one of those things. But the  
 work was great. <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ felt like we were doing an awful lot  
 of good and there <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ concrete evidence of it, <sup>Enough</sup> ~~enough~~  
 concrete evidence of it on occasion <sup>so</sup> ~~so~~ it kept you  
 motivated.

FARLEY: Aside from recovering that square overnight, ~~what would~~  
~~you~~ <sup>single</sup> would ~~signal~~ <sup>signal</sup> out any accomplishment or personal  
 achievement that you were proud of during that tour in India?

WM: Oh, there were a whole series of sort of minor little  
~~triumphs~~ <sup>triumphs</sup>, but something pumped you up almost every week,  
 but nothing outstanding. The only reason I remember that  
 square incident was the reaction from Washington, <sup>Don't</sup> ~~don't~~  
 do that anymore!"

FARLEY: Oh boy, it's unbelievable.

WM: No, we did lots of things like that and never sent the  
 stuff home so we couldn't get gigged.

FARLEY: That's a shame.

WM: Well, that probably goes on to this day. We're always  
 discouraging the field from going <sup>too</sup> ~~too~~ far, exceeding their

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

authority <sup>their</sup> directives.

FARLEY: That's right. But it was a pretty satisfying two years?

WM: For work, sure, oh yeah, had a ball. But I wish it'd been in some other country. I never could adjust to there.

FARLEY: That's terrible. I had 17 glorious months in Brisbane, so, quite a difference. Okay let's go back to Ft. Dix, now ~~you're home, you're~~ <sup>you're home, you're</sup> trying to decide what to do, what happened?

WM: Oh I had no trouble deciding what to do. As soon as ~~it~~ I went home, saw the folks I went down to Washington again and told them I was interested in <sup>reemployment</sup> ~~reemployed~~ <sup>I had</sup> there's no problem about <sup>it.</sup> ~~Mo Klein~~ <sup>Mo Klein</sup> signed me up right away. Shortly after that I went back to work. I think ~~it~~ <sup>had</sup> the whole elapsed time was something like two and a half, three weeks, <sup>between the</sup> ~~by~~ time I got out of the Army and time I signed on again.

FARLEY: Coming in as a civilian again, did you notice the change of pace or a complete relaxation of effort or how different was it from when you left in the '42?

WM: Oh very different, very different. There still was some lingering military. They assigned me to one of the predecessors of P1 when I came back. I guess I'd had enough experience so I should have been a pretty good cryptanalyst functioning on my own. <sup>One</sup> ~~and one~~ of the people I worked with was then Sergeant Walter Jacobs, yeah.

FARLEY: Bletchley Park.

WM: He was back then, he was back. This would be after the war, of course, ~~you're~~ <sup>you're</sup> talking now about October, November, December '45. But he was still in the Army, you see, putting in his time.

FARLEY: What sort of a system were you working on then or did you go into a different area, completely, <sup>different</sup> from the Far Eastern problems?

WM: Oh, various things, sort of free-lanced, <sup>There's</sup> ~~there's~~ the <sup>that</sup> ~~system~~ system, double-transposition, I can recall. <sup>There's</sup> ~~there's~~ an <sup>Ethiopian</sup> ~~Ethiopian~~ double-transposition, Chinese Nationalist ~~system~~ system involving transposition and ~~grilles~~ <sup>grilles</sup>. ~~That~~ <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ had 26 <sup>discriminants</sup> ~~discriminates~~, I forget how they went, but they involved the 26 letters of the alphabet, and ~~the grille~~ <sup>The grille</sup> ~~the thing~~, for A, had a great big A in it, the one for B had a B in it. <sup>Once</sup> ~~once~~ we tumbled ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> at that, we had a hell of a lot of fun recovering that. We broke in on one with a I, <sup>Letter "I"</sup> ~~see~~ took up so little space it was almost simple transposition. Then we got the nulls up there and the nulls down there, "I".

FARLEY: How involved were we with Russian systems?

WM: I'd <sup>been</sup> ~~go~~ back quite a while I guess, <sup>and</sup> I kept hearing about Bourbon. <sup>One</sup> ~~year~~, and one day Captain Kirby called me in said, <sup>"You come</sup> ~~you~~ highly recommended Bill, would you consider transferring to this problem? <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ need your talents." I ~~would~~ <sup>would</sup> ~~go~~ up on the <sup>Bourbon</sup> ~~Burman~~ problem. I guess I had a <sup>to leave the</sup> ~~(359)~~ a predecessor to <sup>P-1 to</sup> ~~do~~ <sup>do</sup> that, but <sup>that was</sup> ~~that's~~ all right.

EO 3.3b(3)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET~~

The ~~the~~ problem was very interesting in those days.

FARLEY:

Had we been reading the system throughout <sup>WWII?</sup> ~~number 2, well~~ ~~not the system~~ ~~Soviet systems had been~~ ~~we~~ <sup>Had we</sup> been directing an effort against the Soviet systems during WW II?

WM:

I couldn't say, I wasn't here.

FARLEY:

Okay.

WM:

I only speak from about early '46 when I transferred to the problem, they had a large going effort so obviously <sup>it had</sup> been going for some time. I don't know whether ~~that~~ <sup>there</sup> probably was a Soviet effort but....

FARLEY:

Were we successful?

WM:

There <sup>must have been</sup> ~~musta been~~ an Irish effort for instance. <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ were neutral, right?

FARLEY:

Yeah.

WM:

And yet I don't now that for a fact. I don't know anybody that worked on it. There probably was a Soviet effort, but it was kept very quiet.

FARLEY:

But were we successful in '46 in reading Soviet systems?

WM:

Sure, but I think that stuff is still compartmented.

FARLEY:

Okay, well fine, we won't talk about it then. I know it is. Okay. Any other systems that intrigue you, some that are unbreakable? <sup>OK</sup>

WM:

Well now <sup>you're</sup> ~~you're~~ getting too current and <sup>I'd</sup> ~~I'd~~ hesitate to put anything on the record for fear that, you know I'd always have to be watching my words and making sure.

FARLEY:

Sure. <sup>you</sup> ~~all right~~ I don't want to do that. That brings us

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

38

up to about '46. Is there anything we've forgotten? I can sort of taper off if you wish. We've been here an hour already.

WM: No, I think that's enough. Let me mull over what I've said and see what else I can dredge up that might be of interest.

FARLEY: All right sir. I know from '46 to the present time there are four or five dozen projects in which you were involved.

WM: Yeah, but all that stuff is very well documented.

FARLEY: Yes, I know, I know.

WM: And

~~FARLEY:~~ The reason I asked you to talk about CBI is because there was so little ~~and little~~ <sup>information</sup> on it.

WM: Well there wasn't much an effort compared to the rest of the war.

FARLEY: I've read their history and I've talked to people who were there like Don Snow and Lambros way back when and I never could quite figure out <sup>how</sup> it worked and who you supported and what?

WM: Well I'm afraid I wasn't much help there.

FARLEY: You were, you were very much.

WM: There was a minor systems group that we had to set up later on because they got so numerous and we were so busy exploiting the mainline <sup>that</sup> Lieutenant Barker, Wayne Barker, who now runs <sup>the Aegean</sup> EG and Press.

FARLEY: Would you mind talking about him as you recall.

WM: A very obnoxious character, tremendous ego, he mystified

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

40

FARLEY: I don't know either. I never knew the guy. I appreciate that comment because we've had various reports on this individual.

WM: I couldn't stand him and he knew it, <sup>He</sup> he knew it.

FARLEY: Sir, I've taken up an hour of your time, shall we knock it off?

WM: Yeah, I think so.

FARLEY: Allright, sir, thank you greatly and maybe later on we can expand a little bit.

WM: Allright.

FARLEY: Thank you.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

William Lutwiniak

NSA - 1, 2, 39  
 SIS - 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 15, 30, 32  
 Friedman - 1, 2, 3, 12  
 Army - 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36  
 Arlington Hall - 1, 5, 6, 13, 19-21, 24, 30, 32  
 CBI - 1, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 26, 38  
 New Delhi - 1, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 28, 30, 32, 33  
 Cryptanalyst - 1, 2, 7, 14  
 Solomon Kullbach - 3, 7, 8, 12, 13, 20, 21  
 Ciphers - 3  
 Captain Hayes - 3-4  
 Signal Corps - 3-4  
 Munitions Building - 3-7, 11, 16, 17, 30  
 Japanese - 5-7, 9-10, 12, 19, 21-22, 24, 32

Purple - 7, 30  
 Abe Sinkov - 8, 22  
 Rowlett - 8, 11  
 Colonel Reichauer - 9, 13  
 IBM - 11, 27  
 Enigma - 11  
 Callimahos - 12, 27, 33, 38, 39  
 Colonel Arrell - 12-13  
 Paul Dirthic - 14, 19, 20  
 Pickering - 14  
 Henley - 14, 23  
 Australia - 14, 22  
 South America - 16-17  
 Major Bickwit - 17-18, 21, 23, 25-26  
 SMAT - 19  
 Captain Stowbridge - 20, 26  
 SIGABA - 20, 39  
 Central Bureau - 22, 26  
 G-2 - 23, 26  
 Frank Tenney - 23  
 Stillwell - 22, 23, 25  
 Bletchley Park - 26, 35  
 Cameron Hosmer - 26  
 Orlando W. Stevenson - 26  
 Captain Pazerky - 26-27  
 Water Transport - 27  
 Burma - 23, 25, 32, 36  
 3147th - 28  
 Cannought Circle - 28  
 British - 29, 32  
 Navy - 30-31  
 TICOM - 33  
 Moe Klein - 35  
 P1 - 35-36  
 Russian Systems - 36-37  
 Lt. Wayne Barker - 38-39  
 Irish effort - 37  
 Captain Kirby - 36

EO 3.3b(3)  
 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605